

TABLE OF CONTENTS

23. ANNEX Q 23-1

23.1 PURPOSE 23-1

23.2 HAZARD 23-1

 23.2.1 HAZARD AGENTS 23-1

 23.2.2 POTENTIAL TARGETS 23-2

23.3 SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 23-3

 23.3.1 SITUATION 23-3

 23.3.2 ASSUMPTIONS 23-4

23.4 GENERAL PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITES 23-4

 23.4.1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT 23-4

 23.4.2 CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 23-4

 23.4.3 DIRECTION AND CONTROL 23-4

 23.4.4 COMMUNICATIONS 23-5

 23.4.5 WARNING 23-5

 23.4.6 THREAT LEVEL 23-5

 23.4.7 EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION 23-7

 23.4.8 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 23-7

 23.4.9 RECOVERY OPERATIONS 23-7

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN**23. ANNEX Q****→ Lead Department: Police/Operations****23.1 PURPOSE**

The purpose of the Terrorism Annex is to provide a crisis and consequence management plan for responding to and recovering from a terrorist-initiated incident. This annex supplements the Emergency Management Plan already in effect and is intended to be used in conjunction with any and all existing functional annexes that may need to be implemented in the course of responding to or recovering from such an incident

23.2 HAZARD

Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, terrorism is defined as activity that involves an act dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States in which it occurs and is intended to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, influence a government or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. See Section 1 (15), Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

Every community in the United States is vulnerable to the growing threat from terrorist events--especially the threatened use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive (CBRNE) material. These incidents, as well as suicide bombings, have increased dramatically, in both frequency and severity, since the 1970s.

23.2.1 Hazard Agents

- Chemical agents might be deployed because of their direct toxic effects on humans, animals, and the environment. The chemical agents most likely to be used in a terrorist attack include cyanide, mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and VX nerve gas;
- Biological agents are bacteria or viruses that could be used to cause and spread disease among the population. The biological agents or diseases most likely to be used in a terrorist attack include anthrax, brucellosis, bubonic plague, cholera, glanders, pneumonic plague, smallpox, tularemia, Q fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), viral encephalitis, and viral hemorrhagic fever;

- Biological toxins are poisons produced by biological organisms. Biological toxins that might be used in a terrorist attack include botulinum, ricin, T2 mycotoxins, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B;
- Nuclear/radiological materials can be used in the form of nuclear weapons, nuclear material dispersed via conventional explosives, and attacks on nuclear facilities;
- The use of explosives by terrorists can result in collapsed buildings, bridges, overpasses, and other infrastructure. Such explosives range in size, complexity, and damage capability from small, homemade pipe bombs to military weapons;
- Other technology, including computers and cyber-terrorism, can be used in terrorist attacks.

23.2.2 Potential Targets

While any person or place could be affected by a terrorist incident, attacks are most likely to target facilities or areas where there are large concentrations of people, structures or facilities of political significance, and infrastructure whose damage or destruction would significantly impair the ability of the community to function normally. Special security measures may be warranted to protect potential targets such as:

- Critical infrastructure/transportation: major highways, bridges, overpasses, railroads and railroad crossings, and train stations;
- Trucking/transport facilities and equipment;
- Government facilities: City, County, State, and Federal government all have facilities in the community that could be targeted;
- Places of assembly, i.e., facilities and locations where large numbers of people gather could be terrorist targets;
- Facilities with large numbers of people, including hospitals, schools, and shopping malls;
- Military installations, including Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves, National Guard, etc.;
- Domestic water supply including the McKenzie River, Springfield Utility Board (SUB) reservoirs, and treatment facilities;
- Dams upstream on the Willamette or McKenzie rivers could be damaged to cause sudden and severe flooding;
- Fuel farms and gasoline distribution lines;
- Chemical manufacturing and storage facilities;
- Propane and natural gas facilities, including pipelines and storage farms;

- Telecommunication and computer systems.

23.3 SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

23.3.1 Situation

- An act of terrorism directed at the City of Springfield may produce major consequences that would overwhelm the capabilities of the City, County, and the State almost immediately. Major consequences involving WMD may overwhelm existing Federal capabilities as well, particularly if multiple locations are involved;
- Operations may involve geographic areas that spread across political boundaries. Unified command will almost certainly be required;
- Local, State, and Federal responders will define working perimeters that may overlap. Perimeters may be used to control access to the area, target public information messages, assign operational sectors among responding agencies, and assess potential effects on the population and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different authorities, which will impede the overall response if adequate coordination is not established;
- If appropriate personal protective equipment is not available, entry into a contaminated area, i.e., a hot zone, may be delayed until the material dissipates to levels that are safe for emergency response personnel. Responders should be prepared for the possibility of secondary devices;
- The situation may not be recognized until there are multiple casualties. Most chemical and biological agents can not be detected by methods used to detect explosives and firearms, and most agents can be carried in containers that look like ordinary items;
- There may be multiple events, i.e., one event in an attempt to influence another event's outcome;
- Responders are placed at higher risk of becoming casualties. In addition to the risk of becoming contaminated before recognizing the agent involved, first responders may be targets for secondary releases or explosions;
- The location of the incident will be treated as a crime scene. As such, preservation and collection of evidence is critical;
- Contamination of critical facilities and large geographic areas may result. Victims may carry a chemical or biological agent unknowingly to public transportation facilities, businesses, residences, or medical facilities without knowing they are contaminated;

- There will be a stronger reaction from the public than with other types of incidents. Managing that reaction including panic control may place a high demand on limited resources.

23.3.2 Assumptions

- The first responders, e.g., Police and Fire & Life Safety personnel or health/medical personnel will, in most cases, initially detect and evaluate the potential or actual incident, assess casualties (if any), and determine whether assistance is required. This assessment will be based on warning or notification of a terrorism incident that may be received from law enforcement, emergency response agencies, or the public;
- The incident may require Federal support. According to HSPD-5, the Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations. In any case, a terrorist incident is reportable to the FBI as soon as it is known or suspected. The FBI generally will be the lead law enforcement agency for criminal investigations in a terrorist incident, but may not be available for some time after the incident occurs;
- This plan will go into effect when a terrorism incident has occurred or a credible threat has been identified.

23.4 GENERAL PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

23.4.1 Crisis Management

Crisis management refers to measures used to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response. The Federal government exercises primary authority to prevent, preempt, and terminate threats or acts of terrorism and to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators. State and local governments provide assistance as required.

23.4.2 Consequence Management

Consequence management refers to measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. State and local governments exercise primary authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal government provides assistance as required. Consequence is generally a multifunction response coordinated by emergency management.

23.4.3 Direction and Control

- The Emergency Plan calls for police to be the designated lead in a terrorist event. An event involving massive damage or a high casualty count will be managed initially under the ICS Unified Command model with Police and Fire & Life Safety as lead departments, depending upon the nature and progression of the event. The lead may shift to Fire & Life Safety if terrorism is not suspected or to Police, and eventually to the FBI, if the event has been identified as a terrorist event and the FBI has resources in place to assume the lead role;
- As soon as an incident is determined to be a terrorist act, the FBI is to be notified. The FBI will be the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for crisis management; the primary role of the FBI will be investigation;
- FEMA is the LFA for consequence management. In this capacity, FEMA will coordinate Federal assistance requested through State authorities using regular National Response Plan (NRP) mechanisms.

23.4.4 Communications

- Due to the sensitivity of information communicated among responding organizations, security of those communications must be maintained;
- Coordination of communications with State and Federal responders is essential;
- See Communications Annex for additional information.

23.4.5 Warning

- There may or may not be warning of a potential terrorism incident. The local FBI field office must be notified of any suspected terrorist threats or incidents.

23.4.6 Threat Level

- The FBI, through its Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), provides a national framework for Federal, State, and local government, allowing government officials and citizens to communicate the nature and degree of terrorist threats. This advisory system characterizes appropriate levels of vigilance, preparedness, and readiness in a series of graduated Threat Conditions. The Protective Measures that correspond to each Threat Condition will help government agencies and citizens determine what action they need to take to help counter and respond to terrorist activity. Based on the threat level, Federal agencies will implement appropriate protective measures. For consistency of terminology, the City of Springfield uses the same system. The HSAS establishes five Threat Conditions with associated suggested protective measures:
- **Low (Green)** Low risk of terrorist attack. The following Protective Measures may be applied:

- ◆ Refining and exercising preplanned Protective Measures;
 - ◆ Ensuring personnel receive training on HSAS, departmental, or agency-specific protective measures;
 - ◆ Regularly assessing facilities for vulnerabilities and taking measures to reduce noted vulnerabilities.
- **Guarded (Blue)** General risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:
 - ◆ Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations;
 - ◆ Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures;
 - ◆ Providing the public with necessary information.
- **Elevated (Yellow)** Significant risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:
 - ◆ Increasing surveillance of critical locations;
 - ◆ Coordinating emergency plans with nearby jurisdictions;
 - ◆ Assessing further refinement of Protective Measures within the context of the current threat information;
 - ◆ Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.
- **High (Orange)** High risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:
 - ◆ Coordinating necessary security efforts with armed forces or law enforcement agencies;
 - ◆ Taking additional precaution at public events;
 - ◆ Preparing to work at an alternate site or with a dispersed workforce;
 - ◆ Restricting access to essential personnel only.
- **Severe (Red)** Severe risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:
 - ◆ Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning specially trained teams;
 - ◆ Monitoring, redirecting or constraining transportation systems;
 - ◆ Closing public and government facilities;

- ◆ Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs.

23.4.7 Emergency Public Information

See **Emergency Public Information and Alert & Warning Annex**. (Functional Annex N)

23.4.8 Protective Actions

In-place sheltering. In some cases people in the affected area may be advised to shelter in place rather than evacuate. Notification will be provided through one or more of the systems listed in the Emergency Public Information and Alert & Warning Annex.

- Evacuation. See **Evacuation Annex** (Functional Annex G)
- Mass Care. See **Shelter and Mass Care Annex** (Functional Annex P)

23.4.9 Recovery Operations

As in any disaster, there is a recovery phase to restore the community to a state of normalcy following the event. These steps are included in the various functional annexes in the City's Emergency Plan. A terrorism incident may present special challenges such as:

- Early need for structure damage assessment;
- Need for decontamination of people and facilities beyond the primary incident scene;
- Ongoing public information to inform and reassure the community;
- Large-scale debris removal operation;
- Short-term and long-term health care and mental health services for victims;
- Counseling assistance to first responders and other emergency workers.

Annex Q, Terrorism.....	23-1	Potential Targets	23-2
Assumptions		Purpose	
Terrorism	23-4	Terrorism	23-1
Biological Weapons.....	23-1	Recovery Operations	23-7
Bridges.....	23-2	Responders	
Chemical Weapons	23-1	Federal	23-3
Communications.....	23-5	First.....	23-4
Consequence Management	23-4	Local	23-3
Contaminated Area.....	23-3	State	23-3
Crisis Management.....	23-4	Shelter In Place.....	23-7
Damage Assessment.....	23-7	Situation	
Dams.....	23-2	Terrorism	23-3
Evacuation		SUB	23-2
Terrorism	23-7	Target Facilities	23-2
FBI.....	23-4	Terrorism	
FEMA.....	23-5	Defined	23-1
Flood.....	23-2	Terrorism Annex.....	23-1
Hazard Agents	23-1	Terrorist Attack	
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)....	23-5	Elevated Risk	23-5
Hot Zone.....	23-3	Guarded Risk	23-5
HSAS (Homeland Security Advisory System)....	23-5	High Risk.....	23-5
ICS (Unified Command Model)	23-5	Low Risk.....	23-5
Lead Federal Agency (LFA).....	23-5	Severe Risk	23-5
LFA (Lead Federal Agency).....	23-5	Terrorist Incidents.....	23-2
Major Highways	23-2	Threat Level.....	23-5
Military Installations.....	23-2	Utility	
National Response Plan (NRP).....	23-5	Springfield Utility Board (SUB).....	23-2
NRP (National Response Plan).....	23-5	Water Supply	23-2
Nuclear Weapons.....	23-1	Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	23-1
Police	23-1	WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)	23-1